Design: focus on maintainability. Professor Michael Behm
Professor Michael Behm's presentation on "Safe Design Maintainability" offered a profound exploration into the foundational principles of occupational health and safety, shifting the traditional reactive paradigm towards a proactive, integrated design philosophy. Delivered in a virtual meeting format hosted by Geoff Fletcher and Kelvin Genn, the discussion delved into critical concepts, examined complex issues through a pivotal case study, and presented invaluable insights applicable across various industries. The presentation underscored the imperative of embedding safety considerations into the earliest stages of a project's lifecycle, highlighting the transformative potential of "prevention through design" in creating inherently safer and more maintainable built environments.
Professor Michael Behm's Background and Approach
Professor Michael Behm is a distinguished academic and practitioner in occupational health and safety. Formerly a Professor Emeritus for Occupational Health and Safety at East Carolina University, he has since transitioned to Keene State College in New Hampshire. His expertise extends beyond academia, as evidenced by his involvement with Art of Work and their Board of Advisors. Professor Behm's international experience includes a research fellowship at the Centre for Urban Greenery and Ecology in Singapore and RMIT University in Melbourne, where he meticulously studied site design and the built environment. Furthermore, his service with the US National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety and Health underscores his practical engagement with safety regulation and practice.
A defining aspect of Professor Behm's work, as highlighted by Kelvin Genn, is his leading influence in the field of "prevention through design" (PtD). This philosophy forms the bedrock of his approach, which he describes as being "kind of fascinated" by how workers are typically forced to "overcome poor design" in order to accomplish their tasks. His intellectual curiosity lies in understanding the intricate relationship between human activity and the physical environment, particularly how design choices shape worker safety and health. Professor Behm's perspective is rooted in the belief that effective safety management must transcend a mere focus on the environment or individual behaviour; instead, it must address the socio-technical system, which encompasses the complex interplay of workers with the built environment, equipment, tools, and facilities that surround them. This holistic view positions design as a critical determinant of workplace safety, long before any work commences.
Core Concepts and Philosophical Underpinnings
Professor Behm's presentation was structured around several fundamental concepts that collectively articulate the philosophy of prevention through design. Central to his argument is Joe Stevenson's profound observation: "The safety of any operation is determined long before the people, procedures, and equipment. Come together at the work site". This quote, dating back to 1991, serves as a guiding philosophy for accident analysis and proactive risk assessment. Behm posits that a narrow focus solely on the work environment or worker behaviour overlooks the deeper, more systemic issues embedded in design. Understanding the socio-technical system – how workers must interact with the built environment – is paramount. This implies that safety issues are often inherent in the design from the outset, rather than solely emerging from operational activities or human error.
Another crucial concept introduced was Roman Zimburski's chart, originally illustrating the ability to influence cost over a project schedule. Professor Behm adapted this chart by substituting "safety" for "cost", asserting that the same principle applies: the ability to influence safety is highest in the earliest stages of a project – the conceptual and detailed design engineering phases. He highlighted his own past experience in the 1990s where, as a corporate environmental safety and health staff member, he identified numerous problems six weeks before a new facility's startup. However, he lamented that his team had not been involved early enough in the conceptual design phase, where influencing changes would have been significantly easier and less costly. This led to his proposal of adding a "red line" to Zimburski's chart, illustrating that while the ability to identify hazards and risks is high at startup (hindsight), the ability to influence those risks is greatest much earlier in the design process. The goal, according to Behm, is to "build up the area underneath that red line on the left portion" of the chart, thereby proactively integrating safety into initial designs rather than remediating issues later. This requires a shift in mindset and an empathetic understanding of the challenges faced by architects and engineers in the early design phase.
The dichotomy between hindsight and foresight was a recurring theme. Forensic engineers inherently operate with hindsight, analysing what went wrong after an incident. However, Behm advocated for a proactive approach, striving for foresight and predictability in design. This means anticipating potential hazards and risks before they materialise, allowing for their elimination or control through design.
Professor Behm also integrated the Hierarchy of Controls into the design context, presenting a chart developed by a participant (John) that visually represents the effort versus creative potential of different control measures. This hierarchy prioritises:
Elimination: Removing the hazard entirely.
Substitution: Replacing the hazard with a safer alternative.
Engineering Controls: Designing physical changes to the workplace or equipment to reduce exposure to hazards.
Administrative Controls: Implementing work procedures or practices to reduce exposure.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Providing equipment for workers to wear to protect themselves.
Behm stressed the importance of working "above the line", focusing on elimination and engineering controls during the design phase. While this might require greater initial effort, the creative potential for safer and more efficient solutions is significantly higher. Relying on PPE, such as forcing workers to wear spiky shoes on slippery roofs, is indicative of a failure to design for safety upstream.
Finally, the presentation championed the concept of worker-centred design, or focusing on the "user experience" of workers across the entire lifecycle of the built environment – from groundbreaking to decommissioning. This involves "designing for workers' needs" and being predictive, anticipatory, and foreseeable about what workers will experience. A key principle articulated was "bring the work to the worker rather than the worker to the work". This transformative idea suggests that instead of making workers navigate hazardous environments to perform tasks, the design should facilitate bringing the task to a safe, accessible area for the worker. This shift in perspective aims to improve both safety and efficiency, moving beyond mere compliance to foster innovative solutions.
Case Study: Iannello v BAE Automation and Electrical Services Pty Ltd & Ors VSC 544
Professor Behm extensively used the Australian legal case of Iannello v BAE Automation and Electrical Services Pty Ltd & Ors VSC 544 as a practical illustration of his theoretical concepts. He described it as a "very fascinating case" that powerfully demonstrates the challenges and responsibilities associated with safe design and maintainability.
Background of the Incident: The case involved Mr. Santo Iannello, an "highly experienced maintenance engineer" employed by BAE Automation and Electrical Services Pty Ltd (BAE). On 4 February 2005, Mr. Iannello suffered severe head and spine injuries when he fell approximately three metres through an "acrylic skylight" on the "lower roof" of the Colac Otway Performing Arts and Cultural Centre (COPACC). The lawsuit was brought against his employer BAE, the building owner and occupier Colac Otway Shire Council ("the Council"), and Tiena Pty Ltd, the architect responsible for major renovations at COPACC between 1999 and 2000. The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) also brought an action against the Council and Tiena.
The COPACC roof was "split level" and constructed of "cliplock" material. The "lower roof" featured twelve skylights and several split system air conditioning units. The "raised roof" housed newer, larger packaged air conditioner units, which Mr. Iannello regularly serviced under BAE's contract with the Council. Access to the roof required erecting a ladder on the western wall to reach the lower roof, and then climbing onto the raised roof if necessary. Critically, at the time of the accident, the lower roof's skylights were "unprotected by mesh or covering," and there were "no walkways," "no handrails," "no anchor points for harnesses," and "no ladder or steps providing safe access from the lower roof to the raised roof". The cliplock construction itself posed a "potential tripping hazard" due to its raised ribs. The specific skylight involved in the fall was approximately 700mm x 700mm and was made of steel with an acrylic dome.
On the day of the accident, Mr. Iannello and his son Ben secured a ladder to the guttering clips to gain access. After servicing the packaged units on the raised roof, Mr. Iannello was in the process of returning. His toolbox was left on the raised section near its edge with the lower roof. He recalled sitting on the raised section, turning to pick up his toolbox, and then remembering falling, trying to grab onto something. He explicitly stated that it was "foolish to step on [a skylight], suicide". Mr. Robert Harrowfield, the Council's Building Supervisor Officer, testified that Mr. Iannello later told him he was "sitting on the ledge above the skylight," with his feet "three or four inches from the lower level," and that he "jumped off the ledge and fell through the skylight," adding that "it was my own fault" due to distorted distances from his reading glasses. The Judge accepted that this conversation took place and inferred that Mr. Iannello "pushed himself off and either stumbled or tripped on a raised rib of the roof, causing him to fall through the skylight". However, the Judge attached "no significance" to Mr. Iannello's self-blaming remarks.
Post-Accident Actions: Following the incident, WorkSafe Victoria issued an improvement notice to the Council. Almost immediately, the Council installed "mesh covers over all the skylights in the lower roof" at a cost of $2937. Furthermore, in December 2004, large-scale improvements were made to the lower roof, including the installation of "walkways to provide safe access to the air conditioning units". The Council also provided a "short fixed ladder to give access from the raised roof to the lower roof, obviating the need to jump down". Significantly, on 27 May 2005, the Council pleaded guilty to a breach of s 21(2)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Vic) 1985 for failing to provide and maintain safe plant and systems of work.
Foreseeability of Risk: The Court underscored the importance of precisely identifying the foreseeable risk. In this case, the risk was clearly defined as "that a worker carrying out his duties on the roof may fall through a skylight with the prospect of very serious injury". The Judge found that "Each of the defendants should have appreciated that the presence of the unguarded skylight located within the ribbed roof posed a risk of falling to persons likely to be working on the roof". This risk was "not too far-fetched or remote," and the potential for "serious injury was high – a fall of over two metres may well be fatal or it may produce highly disabling injuries". Even the architect, Mr. Bradbury, acknowledged that "anybody accessing a roof should, for all intents and purposes, assume that a skylight represents a hole in the roof. No skylight is safe to presume as safe to be stood or jumped on (sic)".
Apportionment of Liability: The Court determined the proportionate liability of the defendants based on their culpability and the causal potency of their acts or omissions.
BAE (Employer) - 25% liability: BAE, as Mr. Iannello's employer, bore an "independent personal obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that a safe system of work was established and maintained for its employees". Given that servicing air conditioners was "regular" work, BAE was obligated to "develop, and maintain, a methodology or system which would achieve that result". The Court found that BAE "failed to take any steps in relation to considering, devising or implementing a safe system of work," and "no instructions were given to Mr Iannello as to safe access and egress". The employer's duty of care is non-delegable. Crucially, the Court asserted that Mr. Iannello's extensive experience "in some way discharges the obligation of an employer, can be dismissed". The obligation rests "squarely upon the employer to devise and implement a safe system of work," and employee experience, "simpliciter," cannot relieve this obligation. BAE should have conducted a proper risk assessment, identified the skylight hazards, brought them to the Council's attention, and if remedial measures were not taken, "the ultimate solution was for BAE to refuse to send its employees onto the roof until the matter was sorted out". The Court rejected the notion that BAE should have provided temporary walkways or small steps, noting that fixed solutions were the Council's responsibility.
Colac Otway Shire Council (Owner/Occupier) - 65% liability: The Council's obligations stemmed from s 14B of the Wrongs Act, requiring reasonable care to prevent injury from the state of the premises. The Court found that the Council "both knew of and ought to have known of the risks posed by the skylight". By choosing to locate air conditioners on the roof and knowing that contractors would regularly access them, the Council should have recognised the "self-evident" risk of falling through unprotected skylights. The Council had "control of both roofs" and was "the one party which was capable of effecting alterations or improvements to ensure safety on the roof," a factor deemed "significant" in apportionment. Mr. Harrowfield, the Council's Building Supervisor, admitted he knew Mr. Iannello was "being placed at risk" and that the Council "did nothing to alleviate that risk". The Council's reliance on external advice (like Safe Access Systems) or the architect was rejected as it "bore ultimate responsibility for the state of the roof". The Council's approach to safety recommendations was described as "languid," with requests ignored until Mr. Iannello's "near fatal accident" prompted immediate action (installation of mesh, walkways, and a fixed ladder). The Judge concluded that the "major share of liability lies with the Council, given its knowledge of the state of the roof, its knowledge of the presence of the contractors on the roof pursuant to a contract with the Council and its control over the work area".
Tiena Pty Ltd (Architect) - 10% liability: Although admitting liability, the architect's role was deemed least responsible. The primary issue was the architect's "failure to turn his mind to the risks posed by the positioning of the two packaged air conditioners on the raised roof". The architect, Mr. Bradbury, contended that "OH&S was considered very much the matter of the employer" and that architects were "not qualified" to be involved. The Judge emphatically rejected this defense, stating such an attitude might be understandable in the 1930s or 1950s, "but not in relation to a project undertaken in the late 1990s". The Victorian WorkCover Authority Code of Practice for Safe Work on Roofs specifically addressed "design planning" and the safety implications of roof designs, indicating that designers had an obligation to consider worker safety. The architect should have considered worker safety, drawn safe access issues to the Council's attention, and specified appropriate measures in the plans. However, the architect's liability was lower because their role was advisory, they had "no control over the premises or the working conditions," and their involvement "ceased a number of years prior to Mr Iannello’s accident," allowing "ample time for both BAE and the Council to consider the risks posed and to take ameliorating action".
Contributory Negligence: The defendants argued that Mr. Iannello was contributorily negligent by attempting to descend close to the skylight. However, the Court found no contributory negligence on Mr. Iannello's part. The Judge reasoned that Mr. Iannello "was conforming with the system of work (such as it was) as set out by his employer" and "was required to do the best he could to negotiate the roof to get to the air conditioners". Given the absence of a ladder or alternative means of descent, his action was characterised as "mere inadvertence or misjudgment in the performance of his work duties," not negligence. The onus was on the defendants to prove contributory negligence, which they failed to do.
Behm's Commentary on the Iannello Case: Professor Behm highlighted several critical takeaways from the Iannello judgment. He noted the irony of hindsight, where the solutions implemented after the accident (mesh covers, walkways, fixed steps) seemed obvious in retrospect, illustrating the "why didn't they do that?" phenomenon. He lamented that skylight falls remain a significant issue in the U.S., accounting for "30 to 40 workers per year that are still dying", demonstrating a persistent failure in addressing a foreseeable hazard.
Behm found the Judge's rejection of the architect's "we're not qualified" defense particularly compelling. He pointed out that this ruling highlighted Australia's more progressive stance, where "the ideology for safety through design is actually embedded into your legislation," as evidenced by codes of practice for roof design. This contrasts sharply with the U.S., where architects and engineers are often "left unaccountable" in similar workplace safety incidents from a regulatory standpoint, with building owners often able to "wash their hands" of responsibility. Behm explicitly stated that in the U.S., the architect "would never have been brought in" for such a case.
The Judge's finding that BAE, the employer, should have "refused to send its employees onto the roof until the matter was sorted out" resonated deeply with Behm. He contrasted this with the pervasive "Get her done!" mentality prevalent in some work cultures, particularly in the U.S., where getting the job completed often overrides safety concerns. This judicial assertion of the employer's responsibility to refuse unsafe work, even if it delays critical services, was a "really interesting" and powerful aspect of the ruling for Behm.
Finally, the finding of no contributory negligence for Mr. Iannello was a "key phrase" for Behm. It affirmed his view that "workers conform with the system of work," and often, "many, many times, they get it right" despite imperfect systems. This reinforces the idea that rather than blaming the worker for adapting to a flawed system, the focus should be on how the system itself could have been better designed to anticipate and prevent such incidents.
Issues Examined and Insights Presented
Professor Behm's presentation illuminated several critical issues and offered profound insights into the challenges and opportunities in safety through design.
The "Get Her Done!" Philosophy vs. Safe Design: A significant issue highlighted by Behm is the prevailing "Get her done!" mentality, particularly in contexts involving subcontracted work. This cultural imperative prioritises task completion, often at the expense of safety, fostering an environment where immediate output overshadows long-term risk mitigation. The Iannello judgment, however, presented a powerful counter-narrative. The Judge's assertion that BAE, Mr. Iannello's employer, should have "refused to send its employees onto the roof until the matter was sorted out" is a transformative insight. This statement challenges the ingrained notion that work must proceed regardless of unacceptable risks. It places a concrete responsibility on the employer to act as a gatekeeper for safety, even when faced with contractual pressures or external client demands. This principle underscores that the ultimate responsibility for worker safety can, and in some cases must, transcend the immediate task, demanding a proactive stance against inherent workplace dangers. It forces a re-evaluation of the "chain of command" and contractual obligations, compelling all parties to prioritise safety before commencing hazardous work.
Cultural Differences in Safety Accountability (Australia vs. US): One of the most striking insights from Behm's presentation was the stark contrast between the Australian and U.S. approaches to safety accountability in design.
In Australia, as exemplified by the Iannello case, the legal framework for safety through design appears more robust and integrated. The existence of Codes of Practice for Safe Work on Roofs explicitly treats roofs as potential workplaces, signaling a proactive mindset. The Judge's decision to hold the architect and owner accountable, and to reject the architect's defense of being "unqualified" in OH&S matters, underscores a legal expectation for designers to be abreast of contemporary safety standards. This indicates that the "ideology for safety through design is actually embedded into your legislation" in Australia, compelling designers to anticipate and mitigate risks from the outset.
Conversely, in the U.S., Behm noted a distinct "employer-focused" approach, where architects and engineers in the design phase are "really left unaccountable" from a regulatory standpoint. He stated explicitly that in a similar case, the architect "would never have been brought in" in the U.S. context. Building owners, too, often "wash their hands" of regulatory responsibility. This illustrates a more fragmented approach, where accountability tends to reside at the "end of the chain in work" rather than being distributed upstream to those who influence the fundamental design of the workplace. This divergence highlights a fundamental philosophical difference: Australia appears to embrace a shared responsibility across the lifecycle of a project, while the U.S. retains a more compartmentalised view of safety liability.
Foreseeability as an Evolving Concept: The concept of foreseeability is not static, as demonstrated by the Iannello judgment. The Judge's rejection of the architect's defense ("OHS is the employer's responsibility, we're not qualified") with the remark that such an attitude might have been acceptable in the "1930s or the 1950s, but not for a project undertaken in the late 1990s" underscores a crucial insight. This implies that designers have an ongoing obligation to be "lifelong learners" and stay "up to date on what the best practice is". What constitutes "reasonably foreseeable" evolves with advancements in knowledge, technology, and societal expectations regarding safety. Behm noted the challenge in the U.S., where laws may stipulate that only another practicing architect can determine what is "reasonably practical," potentially creating a "vicious cycle" where professional consensus, rather than evolving external standards, limits accountability. A participant's comment, endorsed by Behm, succinctly captured this dynamic: "Foreseeability is emergent from whom is doing the foreseeing". This emphasises that foreseeability is not an objective, timeless truth, but rather shaped by the knowledge, experience, and ethical frameworks of those involved in the design process.
The Workplace as a "Floor": A simple yet profound insight was the concept that a roof, when regularly accessed by maintenance personnel, effectively becomes a "floor". Mr. Quigley, an expert witness in the Iannello case, accepted that the roof was "in effect used by servicemen as a floor," with inherent risks. This re-frames the perception of such areas, demanding that designers consider them as functional spaces requiring the same safety considerations as any other work platform. This insight pushes against the traditional view of roofs as mere structural coverings, forcing designers to acknowledge their operational reality as active workplaces.
Maintainability as a Design Consideration: Behm repeatedly stressed that design must explicitly consider how a structure or system will be maintained throughout its entire lifecycle. This principle, central to "Safe Design Maintainability," moves beyond merely ensuring safety during construction or initial operation.
He cited the School of Art and Design in Singapore, a beautiful building with extensive green roofs. While the architect envisioned students walking up the undulating roof, this didn't materialise due to climate and convenience. However, the grass still needed mowing, forcing maintenance workers to wear "spikes in their shoes" to navigate the challenging terrain. This example perfectly illustrated design-induced workarounds: when designs fail to consider maintainability, workers are often forced to devise unsafe methods to get the job done.
In contrast, Behm presented successful Singaporean examples of "bringing the work to the worker rather than the worker to the work". One notable example was a green wall designed with French doors, allowing maintenance from a safe, enclosed area, making the work "PPE-free". This innovative solution eliminated the need for workers to climb or use harnesses in precarious positions. Another creative solution involved a rotating greenery system for outward-facing plants, enabling horticulturalists to bring the plants into a safe access zone for maintenance. This not only improved safety but also resulted in aesthetic benefits, as plants could be more uniformly exposed to sunlight, creating a "win-win" scenario. These examples underscore that designing for maintainability can lead to creative, innovative solutions that enhance both safety and functionality.
Behm also linked safe design, especially concerning maintainability, to efficiency and competitiveness. He cited the Intel Corporation's approach, where they incorporated feedback from contractors, maintenance personnel, and operators into the design of new chip manufacturing facilities. Intel understood that ease of maintainability translates to "quicker tool turnaround" and faster "time to market", providing a "competitive advantage". This refutes the common misconception that safe design is merely a cost burden; instead, it can be a driver for greater efficiency and innovation.
The Role of Expert Witnesses/Forensic Engineers: Professor Behm recognised that forensic engineers primarily operate in hindsight, analysing past failures. However, he also underscored their crucial role in contributing to the collective "knowledge under the red line" – the body of knowledge that informs and improves future safe design practices. Their investigations into incidents provide valuable lessons that can be used to prevent recurrence and to proactively influence better design decisions, thereby "creating better foresight". Their expertise is vital in challenging the status quo and advocating for designs that are inherently safer and more predictable.
Learnings from the Presentation
Professor Behm's comprehensive discussion, reinforced by the Iannello case and international examples, yields several critical learnings for anyone involved in design, construction, maintenance, and occupational health and safety:
Prioritise Prevention Through Design (PtD): The safety of any operation is fundamentally determined at the design stage, long before people, procedures, and equipment converge at the worksite. This underscores the imperative to invest intellectual and financial capital upfront in design to prevent hazards, rather than relying on costly and often less effective controls later.
Embrace Lifelong Learning and Evolving Standards: Designers and other professionals cannot rely on historical practices or claims of being "unqualified" as a defense for neglecting contemporary safety principles. What was acceptable in previous decades is not acceptable now, as safety knowledge and best practices continually evolve. It is a professional obligation to stay "up to date on what the best practice is".
Conduct Holistic Risk Assessment Across the Life Cycle: Beyond identifying immediate hazards, it is essential to consider the entire socio-technical system. This means anticipating how workers will interact with the built environment from its initial construction through its operational life (including maintenance) and eventual decommissioning. Risks must be assessed for every phase where human interaction with the design is required.
Shared Accountability Beyond the Employer: While employers bear a primary and non-delegable duty for employee safety, the Iannello case starkly illustrates that building owners and designers also hold significant responsibility. Parties who control the workplace or influence its creation through design choices are increasingly held accountable for the safety outcomes.
Challenge Excuses and Inaction: The "we're not qualified" or "it's not our responsibility" arguments are no longer tenable in a mature safety context. Furthermore, an employer's duty can extend to the refusal of work if conditions are demonstrably unsafe and the controlling party (e.g., building owner) fails to remediate them. This requires courage and a strong commitment to safety principles.
Focus on Elimination and Engineering Controls ("Above the Line"): The hierarchy of controls dictates that the most effective safety measures are those that eliminate or engineer out hazards. Design solutions should prioritise these "above the line" controls over administrative measures or reliance on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), which are often less reliable and place the burden of safety on the worker.
Design for Maintainability as a Core Principle: How a facility or product will be maintained throughout its lifespan must be an explicit consideration during design. Solutions should aim to "bring the work to the worker rather than the worker to the work," reducing exposure to hazards and improving efficiency.
Anticipate and Prevent Design-Induced Workarounds: Poor design often forces workers to devise informal, potentially unsafe workarounds to complete tasks. Good design anticipates these needs and provides safe, integrated methods for all necessary tasks, thereby reducing the likelihood of accidents.
Safety as a Driver for Innovation and Efficiency: Safe design is not merely a compliance burden or an added cost; it can be a powerful catalyst for innovation, leading to more efficient processes, improved functionality, and even enhanced aesthetics. The Intel example demonstrates how design for maintainability directly translates into competitive advantages like faster time to market.
Integrate Worker Knowledge into Design: The practical knowledge and experience of workers – those at the "sharp end of operations" – are invaluable. Incorporating their insights into the design phase can lead to more practical, effective, and user-friendly safety solutions, fostering foresight and better anticipation of risks.
Safe Design is a Collaborative, Brainstorming Exercise: It is not a rigid checklist. Every project is unique, requiring collaborative brainstorming guided by overarching principles. This approach allows for flexibility and creative problem-solving tailored to specific contexts.
Conclusion
Professor Michael Behm's presentation on "Safe Design Maintainability" serves as a compelling call to action, urging a fundamental paradigm shift in how safety is conceived and implemented in the built environment. His core message is unequivocal: true safety is achieved not by reacting to failures but by proactively integrating safety principles into the earliest stages of design, long before operations begin. This necessitates a deliberate move from hindsight to foresight, where potential hazards are anticipated and eliminated through intelligent design choices.
The Iannello v BAE case powerfully underscored these principles, demonstrating how a failure in design, coupled with insufficient risk management by the owner and employer, led to severe injury. The judgment, particularly its apportionment of liability and the rejection of the architect's outdated defense, highlights Australia's progressive approach where a shared responsibility for safety is increasingly embedded within legislative frameworks and professional expectations. This stands in contrast to the more fragmented accountability often seen in the U.S. context, offering valuable lessons for global safety practices.
The presentation emphasized that safe design is intrinsically linked to constructability and maintainability, yielding synergistic benefits beyond mere compliance. By designing for ease of maintenance, businesses can enhance efficiency, reduce costs, and even foster innovation and aesthetic appeal, as demonstrated by the Singaporean examples. Ultimately, the pursuit of safe design is about creating more resilient systems that reduce human vulnerability, ensuring that workers are not forced to overcome inherent design flaws through resilience or dangerous workarounds.
As Professor Behm aptly illustrated, the journey towards pervasive safe design is like sculpting a masterpiece: you don't add the safety features after the sculpture is finished and the viewers are already admiring it, hoping no one trips over an unforeseen edge. Instead, you carve safety into the very form and function from the first chisel stroke, ensuring that every line, curve, and texture inherently guides and protects, making the masterpiece not just beautiful, but also enduringly safe and effortlessly maintainable for generations to come. This initial, thoughtful shaping, rather than last-minute patching, defines true excellence in design and safety.
